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In this paper I will propose a compositional semantics for counterfac­
tuals motivated by the need to solve some puzzles that I will shortly discuss. 
The main thesis is that the puzzles of counterfactuals can be understood 
once we unveil the hidden quantification over times . I will propose that the 
essential feature of a counterfactual is the presence above the modal operator 
of temporal and aspectual operators manipulating the time argument of the 
accessibility relation. In section I will discuss the puzzles of counterfactuals ; 
and in sections ( 1 2) and (23) I will present my proposal . 
1 .  The puzzle of counterfactuals 
According to Kratzer 's semantics for conditionals , there are two parame­
ters that contribute to the interpretation of the modal , a modal base and 
an ordering source (Kratzer ( 1 991 ) ,  Kratzer ( 1 98 1 ) ) .  Symplifying Kratzer ' s  
proposal , a modal base is a set of worlds w where all the propositions in the 
conversational background are true: if Rw is the conversational background 
- a function that assigns to w a certain set of propositions - the modal base 
is n R(w) . An ordering source is a function that ranks all the worlds in the 
modal base according to how close they get to some "ideal" in the evalu­
ation world (where the "ideal" is also a set of propositions) . To illustrate 
this system, let us briefly consider the Kratzerian analysis of the epistemic 
indicative conditional in ( 1 ) .  
( 1 )  If Jack i s  reading a book , it must b e  a novel. 
R is epistemic and assigns to the evaluation world w the set of propositions 
that the speaker knows in the evaluation world w, so that the modal base 
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n R( w ) is the set of worlds where all the speaker knows in w is true. The 
ordering source is stereotypical :  the accessible worlds (the worlds in the 
modal base) are ranked according to how close they get to the speaker 's 
stereotypes in the evaluation world w . In the tree below, R is the modal 
base , G is the ordering source. Kratzer 's proposal for counterfactuals is that 
R is empty and ,  consequently, the modal base is W. As for the ordering 
source , it is totally realistic. 
(2) 
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R r.p 
( (st) (st ) )  t 
7/J 
t 
Lewis ( 1973) ' s  analysis of counterfactuals is similar in spirit to what 
we have just described. For Lewis too, there are two parameters that enter 
into the evaluation of the truth-conditions of a counterfactual :  a system of 
spheres of accessibility (w.r . t .  to an evaluation world w ) , and a comparative 
similarity relation �w , ranking accessible worlds according to how similar 
they are to the evaluation world w . 
The reason for having a large modal base , W, is that the antecedent of 
a counterfactual is typically known to be inconsistent with what is assumed 
to be true . 
(3) Jack is dead. 
If Jack were alive , he would be a hundred years old .  
However , when the antecedent of a counterfactual carries a presupposition 
trigger , the presupposition in the antecedent cannot be inconsistent with the 
common ground. I will assume with Musan ( 1997) that most predicates carry 
a presupposition that their subjects be in existence or alive at the time when 
the predicate is said to hold of them. For instance , to say that x attends y 
at t presupposes that x is alive at t ,  as shown below. 
QUANTIFICATION OVER TIMES IN SUBmNCTIVE CONDITIONALS 
(4) [attendy,g ,w,t (x) (y) is defined only if x is alive at t in Wj if defined, 
[attend]C,g ,w,t (x) (y) = 1 iff x attends y at t in w . 
(5) Jack is dead. 
# If Jack attended commencement this summer , he would meet the 
new Dean. 
The infelicity of (5) cannot be due to the counterfactuality of the antecedent , 
since (3) is felicitous . In Kratzer ' s  and Lewis 's  theories of counterfactuals , 
we look for possible worlds that differ from the actual world as much as it is 
required by the truth of the antecedent . Because these theories make no dis­
tinction between what the antecedent supposes and what is presupposes , (3) 
and (5) are treated in the same way. In both, we must select counterfactual 
worlds where Jack will attend commencement this summer, and in both the 
minimal change (with respect to the actual world) necessary to guarantee 
consistency is that in these worlds Jack did not die when he actually did 
and will be still alive at the time of the commencement . Consequently, (3) 
and (5) are both predicted to be felicitous . In fact , following Kratzer ' s  and 
Lewis 's  recipe for counterfactuals , (5)  is expected to be as felicitous as the 
following counterfactual conditional. 
(6) Jack is dead. 
If Jack were alive and attended the commencement this summer, he 
would meet the new Dean. 
What the contrast between (5) and (6) shows is that to treat the proposition 
that Jack will be alive at the time of the commencement as part of the 
supposition (the antecedent) itself is not correct . As we already hinted above, 
the proposition that Jack will be alive at the time of the commencement must 
be treated as a presupposition. However, in the next section we will see that 
this is not straightforward as one might hope. 
2 . 1 .  Presuppositions in the antecedents of counterfactuals 
According to Stalnaker (Stalnaker ( 1978) ) ,  Karttunen (Karttunen ( 1974) ) ,  
Heim (Heim ( 1 982) , Heim ( 1 983) ) ,  propositions are sets of worlds and pre­
suppositions are propositions . The operation of adding a proposition <p to a 
context c (also a set of worlds) amounts to intersecting p and c and this oper­
ation is only defined if <p 's presuppositions ,  pS (<p) , are entailed by c. However , 
as pointed out in Heim ( 1992) , when we combine this theory of presupposi-
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tions with Kratzer/Lewis ' s  analyses of counterfactuals , we run into problems . 
The framework developed in Heim ( 1 992) is Context Change Semantics . The 
main thesis is that the meaning of a sentence is its context change potential 
(CCP ) ,  i .e .  a function from contexts to contexts .  In order to illustrate how 
this works , considers Heim's proposal for the context change potential of an 
indicative conditional . 
(7) CONTEXT CHANGE POTENTIAL FOR INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS : 
c + if <p, 'IjJ = {w E c : SIMw (C + <p) + 'IjJ = SIMw (C + <p) } 
The CCP in (7) is  the rendition of Stalnaker ( 1975) ' s  proposal that the 
pragmatic constraint at work in indicative conditionals is that the selection 
function must select an antecedent-world inside the context set , i . e .  inside 
the set of worlds modeling the information state of the participants in the 
conversation. 1 In (7) , the antecedent <p is added to the context set C and the 
worlds that are selected are those <p-worlds inside C that are most similar to 
what we take the actual world to be .2  By assuming that when a function 
takes the empty set as is argument it is undefined ,  we guarantee that an 
indicative conditional is only felicitous if <p is compatible with the context 
set , and if <p 's presuppositions are entailed by the context set . Let us now 
turn to counterfactuals . If we couch Kratzer ' s  claim that the modal base in 
counterfactual is W within Heim's  theory, we run into problems . 
(8) Problematic CCP for counterfactuals : 
c + if <p, 'IjJ = {w E c : SIMw (W + <p) + 'IjJ = SIMw (c + <p) } 
(8) is what the CCP for a counterfactual would have to look like : the context 
set C has been replaced by the set of all possible worlds W,  precisely to 
capture the fact that the antecedent may be counterfactual . However, as 
Heim points out , the CCP in (8) incorrectly predicts that a counterfactuals 
whose antecedent carries a presupposition should be undefined, since the 
operation of adding <p to W is always undefined because W cannot have the 
right entailment . The counterfactual in (9) is felicitous despite the fact that 
its antecedent carries the presupposition that somebody other than Jack is 
in the room. 
(9) Johni is the only person in the room. 
If Jackp were in the room tOOi , it would be loud. 
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Heim's solution is to revise the context set so that some assumptions are 
dropped (in order to be compatible with the counterfactual antecedent) , but 
some assumptions are kept (in order to entail the antecedent 's presupposi­
tions) . The result is a superset of c, defined as follows .  
( 10) For any context c ,  LF <p : 
revcp (c) , the revision of c for <p , is U {X � W: C � X and 
X + <p is defined} 
The new CCP for a counterfactual conditional will look as in ( 1 1 ) .  
( 1 1 )  CONTEXT CHANGE POTENTIAL FOR COUNTERFACTUALS : 
C + if <p , would 'lj; = {w E c :  sIMw (revcp (c) + <p) + 'Ij; = SIMw (C + <p) } 
Since c C revcp (c) , requiring that revcp (c) � pS (<p) guarantees that c� pS (<p) ,  
thus accounting for the infelicity of (5) . 
As Heim herself points out , though, this solution seems rather stip­
ulative : the revision of the context set is not motivated independently and 
the requirement that pS (<p) be entailed by c is simply added as a condition 
on the way the revision of the context set is obtained .  Furthermore , Heim's 
proposal does not account for the contrast between what elsewhere I called 
one past and two pasts counterfactuals (Ippolito (2003b) , Ippolito (2003a) ) .  
( 1 2) a .  ONE PAST COUNTERFACTUAL 
Jack died last year. 
#If Jack attended commencement this summer , he would meet 
the new Dean. 
b .  Two PASTS COUNTERFACTUAL 
Jack died last year. 
If Jack had attended commencement this summer , he would 
have met the new Dean. 
The two counterfactuals above are morphologically different , and have differ­
ent felicity conditions as witnessed by the fact that ( 1 2-b) is felicitous even 
though ps ( <p) is counterfactual too (Jack will be dead at the time of the 
commencement) .  If we give the CCP for ( 12-b) following the recipe in ( 1 1 ) ,  
( 1 2-b) should come out infelicitous , since pS (<p) (that Jack will b e  alive this 
summer) are not entailed by the context set . As it i s ,  Heim's solution does 
not account for this contrast . 
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2 .  The proposal 
The objective of this paper is to derive the projection properties of presuppo­
sitions in both one past and two pasts counterfactuals from the quantification 
over times hidden in their structure. By doing so , we will address the ques­
tion: What are the necessary components of counterfactuals that distinguish 
them from indicative conditionals? 
( 1 3 )  I f  Jack attends commencement this summer , he  will meet the new 
Dean. 
( 14) If Jack attended commencement this summer, he would meet the 
new Dean. 
Instead of conversational backgrounds , I will talk about accessibility rela­
tions . 3  I take the accessibility relation in counterfactuals to be metaphysical, 
and I take it to have a time parameter in addition to a world parameter. Let 
the accessibility relation MET be defined as follows .  
( 15)  [MET] C,g,w ,t = AP E D <i< st» . AW' . w' has the same history as W up 
to t and p (w') (t) = 1 .  
The second parameter for the evaluation of a conditional sentence i s  an overall 
similarity function SIM , defined in ( 16 ) .4 The entry for the modal operator 
WOLL is given in ( 1 7) .  
( 16)  [SIM]C,g,t ,w = AP E D <st> . AW' . p(w') = 1 and -,:3w" [ p (w") = 1 and 
w" is overall more similar to W than w'] . 
( 17) [WOLL]c,g ,t ,w = Ap. Aq. 'Vw' [P (w') � q(w') ] . 
I will be using an intensional semantics and I will make the assumption that 
sentences are evaluated with respect to two times , one which I will call the 
evaluation time , and the other which I will call the event time. To illustrate 
this point , consider the sentence Jack attended commencement as uttered 
now: the evaluation time is the speech time ;  the event time is the past time 
at which Jack attended commencement . In this particular example , the past 
tense manipulates the event time. However , tenses can also manipulate the 
evaluation time , as in the more complex sentence A week ago Jack said that 
John would call yesterday : the time of evaluation of the embedded clause is 
not the speech time (the calling is not located in the future) , but the past time 
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at which Jack's utterance was made . 5  As will become clearer shortly below, 
my proposal is  that temporal operators can manipulate the time argument 
of the accessibility relation , which is the time at which the antecedent and 
the consequent propositions are evaluated. 
2 . 1 .  Quantification over t imes 
The structure of a one past counterfactual If Jack attended commencement 
this summer, he would meet the new Dean i s  the structure of a "bare" con­
ditional6 embedded under the structure of a universal perfect, as shown in 
( 18) . 
( 18)  
PERF 
( (it ) t )  
t (by TFAl )  
t (by TFAl )  
Vr;;, 
( (it ) t )  
WOLL 
( (st) ( (st ) t ) )  
(st , t )  
t (by IFA) 
(st) 
--------------
SI� (st) 
( (st) ( st) ) (by TFAl , IFA) 
� 
�ET 'P 
( (i (st) ) (st) )  t 
Let us backtrack a little . The view of the perfect that I have in mind 
is taken from Fintel and Iatridou (2002) , and is an elaboration of Dowty 
( 1 979) ' s Extended Now theory of the perfect . According to Fintel and Iatri­
dou (2002) , the LF of the universal perfect sentence in ( 19-a) is ( 1 9-b) . 7  
( 19 )  a .  John has been pitching since 1998 . 
b .  [ [TP PRES [PERF since 1 998 [AspP I�p [vp John pitch] ] ] ] ]C,g,w,t 
= 1 iff 3t : RB(t ,  t' ) and LB ( 1998,  t' ) and Vt" s:;;; t' : John pitch 
in w at til . 
PERF,  the perfect operator , introduces a time interval , whose right boundary 
(RB) is determined by the c-commanding tense (Present in our example) . 
?j; 
t 
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IMP ,  the imperfective aspect , is interpreted as a universal quantifier over the 
subintervals of the perfect interval .s The relevant definitions are given in 
(20) . 
(20) [PERFl,g,t ,w = )..P<it> . :Jt' : RB(t , t' ) and [Pl,g ,W (t' )  = 1 .  
( 2 1 )  [vdC,g,t,w = )..P<it> .Vt' � t :  [P]W (t' )  = 1 .  
When PERF and V� are interpreted in the conditional structure in ( 18 ) , we 
obtain the following truth-conditions . (See the Appendix for the outline of 
the derivation . )  Since there is no tense above PERF , the RB will coincide 
with t ,  the evalaution time of the whole structure (i .e .  the speech time) . 
(22) [If Jack attended commencement this summer, he would meet the 
new Dean] C,g,w,t = 1 iff 
:3t' : RB(t , t' ) 1\ Vt" � t' [Vw' [w' is metaphysically accessible from 
w at t" 1\ :3t'" t t" s .  t .  it  is true in w' at t" that Jack will attend 
commencement this summer at till 1\ -dw": [w" is metaphysically 
accessible fom w at t" and s . t .  it is true in w" at t" that Jack will 
attend commencement this summer 1\ w" is overall more similar to 
w than w'] ----+- :3t"" t t" s . t .  it is true in w' at t" that Jack will meet 
the new Dean at t""] ] . 
The important point in the proposal above is that when we evaluate a sub­
junctive conditional if !p,  would 'IjJ , we evaluate the bare conditional if !p, 'IjJ 
at each subinterval of the perfect interval . The subjunctive conditional if !p, 
would 'IjJ is true just in case at each subinterval the bare conditional if !p ,  'IjJ is 
true . Let me spend a few words on the temporal interpretation of !p and 'IjJ. 
Since the bare conditional is evaluated at past subintervals as well as at the 
speech time, we must postulate a temporal operator in the structure of both 
!p and 'IjJ so as to correctly interpret the future and present temporal adverbs 
that may occur in a one past counterfactual .  I call this operator NON-PAST, 
and I assume it has roughly the following meaning. 9 
(23) [ NON-PAST ]g ,c,w ,t , = )..P<i,t> . :3t' [t' t t and P (w) (t' ) = 1 ] 
( 18 )  is the structure of a one past counterfactual . The first significant out­
come of this proposal is that it is a proposal about how to derive the truth­
conditions of a counterfactual compositionally, as shown in (22) . As I will 
discuss in the next section , the second significant outcome of the proposal is 
QUANTIFICATION OVER TIMES IN SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS 
that it sheds light on the puzzles of counterfactuals we began with ,  i .e .  ( i) 
the fact that despite the counterfactuality of the antecedent , the antecedent 's 
presuppositions ( if any) must hold not only in the antecedent-worlds but also 
in the actual world ,  and (ii ) the contrast between one past and two pasts 
counterfactuals . 
3.  Presupp osition projection 
Consider the contrast between (24) and (25) again. 
(24) Jack is  dead . 
If Jack were alive , he would be a hundred years old. 
(25) Jack is dead . 
#If he attended commencement this summer, he would meet the 
new Dean. 
To put it differently, the two facts that seem difficult to reconcile in a non­
stipulative theory of counterfactuals are the following: ( 1 )  the antecedent 
cp of a subjunctive conditional can be counterfactual , i . e .  there may be no 
cp-world accessible from the actual world at the speech time; (2)  however, 
even when cp is counterfactual , ps ( cp) cannot be counterfactual. 
The objective of this section is to show that once we unveil the tem­
poral quantificational structure in counterfactuals ,  the contrast above is re­
duced to the behavior of presupposition projection in other sentences with 
quantifiers in the same configuration. 
In light of examples that we will discuss below , I claim that the fol­
lowing generalization holds .  
(26) PROJECTION 
a. If a quantifier Q2 occurs in the nuclear scope of another quanti­
fier Q l ,  and a variable bound by Ql occurs in the restriction of 
Q2 , then the existential presupposition of Q2 acts as a domain 
restrictor for Q2 . 
Q l [R . . .  ] [NS Q2 [R . .  Xl . .  ] [NS . . .  ] ] 
b .  Any other presupposition trigger in the nuclear scope of  Ql  does 
not act as a domain restrictor for Ql . 
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The difference that (26) draws is the difference between the existential re­
quirement that the restriction of a quantifier not be empty and other types 
of presuppositions . In what follows , I will first present the facts that justify 
the generalization in (26) , and ,  second, I will briefly comment on the nature 
of the distinction drawn in (26) in light of the debate on what the nature of 
the non-empty domain presupposition of quantifier i s .  
Beaver (200 1 ) , and Beaver ( 1994) , pointed out that presuppositions in 
the nuclear scope of a universal quantifier must be true of every individual in 
the domain of the quantifier, or, in other words , this presupposition cannot be 
accommodated in the restriction of the quantifier (what is called intermediate 
accommodation ) . This is illustrated in (27) , from Beaver (200 1 ) :  the context 
does not warrant the presupposition that every team members can drive , and 
the sentence in bold is odd. 
(27) How many team members and cheerleaders will drive to the match? 
# Few of the 15 team members and none of the 5 cheerleaders can 
drive , but every team member will come to the match in her 
car . So expect about 4 cars . 
Below is a similar example: the context is such that the presupposition 
triggered by the possessive phrase his pubblication is not satisfied by every 
male student in the domain of quantification of the quantifier every. Similarly 
to (27) , (28-a) is infelicitous . 
(28) a. In this department , most of our male students do not have pub-
lications . # However, every male student presented his 
publication at SALT. 
b .  In this department , most of  our male students do not have publi­
cations . However , every publicat ion by every male student 
was presented at SALT .  
In contrast , the bold sentence in (28-b) , with the inverse linking interpreta­
tion, is judged felicitous . At LF the quantifier every pubblication is in the 
nuclear scope of every male student ; therefore , we would expect that the 
non-empty domain presupposition for every pubblication - i . e .  that there is 
a pubblication by x - should be satisfied by every male student in the do­
main. However, in a context that does not warrant the strong presupposition 
that every male student in the domain has a pubblication ,  the sentence is 
still fine. 
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3 . 1 .  Back to counterfactuals 
Presupposition projection in counterfactuals is just another instance of the 
generalization in (26 ) .  The structure in (30) is the skeleton of a one past 
counterfactuals , e .g. (29) . 
(29) Jack is dead . 
(30) 
#If Jack attended commencement this summer , he would meet the 
new Dean.  
P ERF 
V� 
ps = :3t" � t' 
(3 
� 
8 't/J 
--------
Vw c 
ps = :3w' : c (w') � 
81M A 
Rmet cp 
The two universal quantifiers V c and V w are precisely in the configu­
ration described in (26) . The presupposition of the node (3 will be as follows. 
(3 1 )  ps ({3) = :3t" [t" � t' /\ :3w' : c (w') ] . 
As the presupposition that x ,  for x a male student , has a pubblication in 
(28-b) does not have to hold of every male student in the domain, in (30) the 
presupposition that there is a cp-world accessible at t" does not have to hold of 
every t" in the domain of quantification. In these two cases , it is enough that 
there is a male student x in our department that has a pubblication , and a 
t" in the perfect interval such that a cp-world is accessible then , respectively. 
This means that a one past subjunctive conditional requires that at some 
time during the perfect interval there is an accessible cp-world.  It does not 
require that at all subintervals there is an accessible cp-world: consequently, it 
does not require that cp be possible at the speech time and maximally similar 
to the actual world. 10 
However , any other presuppositions in the nuclear scope of V � cannot 
act as a domain restrictor for the quantifier , and they must hold of every 
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subinterval in the restriction of the quantifier. The nuclear scope of 'v'e is " 
the "bare" conditional , so that psb) are going to be ps (cp) and ps(1jJ) not 
entailed by cpo These presuppositions are required to be true of all subinter­
vals ,  including the speech time. The requirement that the presuppositions 
in the antecedent of a one past counterfactual must be entailed by the con­
text follows from the fact that a bare conditional occurs in the scope of the 
universal quantifier over subintervals of the perfect interval . 
The fact that , while cp can be counterfactual ,  ps(cp) cannot , turns out 
to follow from the quantificational structure over times and worlds that we 
have assumed above. Now that we have reduced the puzzle of one past coun­
terfactuals to the behavior of presupposiitons in quantificational structures 
(the generalization in (26) ) ,  one question remains: what is the nature of the 
contrast in (26 ) ?  What is the nature of the contrast between the no-empty 
domain restriction of the universal quantifier and other types of presupposi­
tion triggers , e .g .  to stop? For lack of space , I must leave this question open 
in this paper. But let me mention that the contrast pointed out above sug­
gests that the no-empty-domain restriction of the universal quantifier should 
not be viewed as a semantic presupposition , but as the result of a pragmatic 
condition requiring speakers to avoid making statements trivially true , u  
To sum up , the presupposition of a one past counterfactal requires 
that for all the subintervals tf of the perfect interval , ps (cp) and ps(1jJ) are 
entailed by the set of worlds metaphysically accessible at tf . Since the per­
fect interval in a one past counterfactual includes the speech time , ps ( cp) and 
ps( 1jJ) are required to be entailed by the set of worlds metaphysically acces­
sible at the speech time .  Following the notion of pragmatic presupposition 
developed in Stalnaker ( 1974) , Stalnaker ( 1 978) , and Soames ( 1 989) , among 
others , an utterance of a one past counterfactual is an assertion only if this 
presupposition (felicity condition) is entailed by the context set . 12 Since the 
context set is the set of worlds where what the speaker presupposes is true, 
an utterance of a counterfactual is an assertion only if the speaker presup­
poses that the presupposition of the counterfactual is true , i . e .  only if the 
speaker presupposes that ps ( cp) and ps ( 1jJ) are entailed by the set of worlds 
metaphysically accessible at the speech time. 
If my analysis is correct , the puzzle of one past counterfactual dis­
cussed in Heim ( 1992) reduces to the way presuppositions project in quanti­
fied structures .  There is still an important question which for lack of space 
we set aside , i . e .  why the projection facts are the way they are in general . 
I briefly speculated on what the reason might be , but a full investigation of 
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this issue must be postponed. The point is that , given the quantificational 
structure I suggested, the presupposition properties of counterfactuals are 
indeed expected to arise . 
4.  Two pasts counterfactuals 
The second puzzle of counterfactuals was instantiated by the pair below.  
(32) a. ONE PAST SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONAL 
Jack died last year. 
#If Jack attended commencement this summer , he would meet 
the new Dean. 
b .  Two PASTS SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS 
Jack died last year . 
If Jack had attended commencement this summer, he would 
have met the new Dean. 
Applying Heim ( 1 992) 's context change potential for counterfactuals to (32-b) 
delivers the wrong result : since the revision of the context set is  a superset 
of the context set , the latter was required to entail ps (cp) , and (32-b) is in­
correctly predicted to be infelicitous on a par with (32-a) . 
The proposal that I have presented above naturally accounts for the 
contrast between (32-a) and (32-b) : the extra layer of past in two pasts 
counterfactuals contributes to the difference in meaning. In particular , my 
proposal is that a two pasts counterfactual is an bare conditional embedded 
under the structure of a PAST PERFECT, as shown in the simplified skeletal 
structure in (33) . 
(33) [ [TP PAST [Per/P P ERF [AspP Vr; [ [WOLL cpj'ljl I I I  ] C,g,w,t 
The truth-conditions for (32-b) will be as follows (abstracting away from the 
interpretation of the NON-PAST operator in both cp and 'ljl) . 
(34) [If Jack had attended commencement this summer, he would 
have met the new Dean]C,g,w,t = 1 iff 
:3t' : RB (t"' , t' ) A Vt" � t' [Vw' [w' is metaphysically accessible from 
w at til A :3t"" t til s . t .  it is true in w' at til that Jack will attend 
commencement this summer at t"" A -dw" [w" is metaphysically 
accessible fom w at til and s . t .  it is true in w" at til that Jack will 
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attend commencement this summer A w" is overall more similar to 
w than w'] ---jo :::Jt"'" � t" s . t .  it is true in w' at til that Jack will 
meet the Dean at t""' l l , defined only if t'" -< t . 
The difference between the truth-conditions in (22) and those in (34) is that 
whereas in the former the right boundary of the interval is the speech time , in 
the latter the right boundary of the interval is  a past time. The contribution 
of the extra level of past in (32-b) is shifting the right boundary of the interval 
to the past . As a result , the whole interval lies in the past . As we explained 
above , for every subinterval t" of the perfect interval , the presuppositions 
in the embedded conditional (ps (<p) ,  and ps ('ljI) not entailed by <p) must be 
entailed by the set of worlds accessible at t" . This time ,  however, the speech 
time is not included in the perfect interval since the right boundary is a past 
time.  Therefore , ps(  <p) is not required to be entailed by the set of worlds 
accessible at the speech time, and the speaker is not required to presuppose 
that it is . 13 
5. Conclusion 
Let me briefly summarize the ideas that I have discussed in this paper. I 
have proposed a compositional semantics for counterfactuals (subjunctive 
conditionals) based on the idea that a counterfactual is a bare conditional 
embedded under temporal and aspectual operators . Here i s  the summary of 
the proposal. Two pasts counterfactuals are characterized by the occurrence 
of past perfect morphology, (despite the fact that the supposition is about 
the future) .  The structure of a two pasts counterfactual is a bare conditional 
embedded in the structure of a universal past perfect : 
[ [TP PAST [PerfP PERF [AspP Vr;, [If <p , WOLL 'ljI l l l ]C,g ,w,t 
One past counterfactuals are characterized by an occurrence of past less than 
their two pasts counterparts .  Their structure is like that one above minus 
the top layer of past : 
[ [PerfP P ERF [AspP Vr;, [If <p , WOLL 'ljI l l  y,g,w,t 
I have argued that once we unveil the quantification over times hidden 
in counterfactuals , their presuppositional properties can be reduced to the 
properties of any quantificational structure. 
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App endix 
• ONTOLOGY:  
D - {O 1 } ·  D - W· D - DDa .  D - T· 1 - DWxT t , , s , <a,b> b ' i , a a . 
• COMPOSITION RULES : 
Functional Application : 
[a<a,b>/3a]W,t = [a]W,t ( [j3]W ,t ) 
Intensional Functional Application (IFA) : 
[a« sa> ,b>/3a] C,w,t = [ay,w,t (Aw' . [j3]c,w' ,t ) 
T(emporal) Functional Applications (TFA) : 
1 . [a« ia>b>/3a]C,w,t = [a]C,w ,t (At' . [j3] C,w ,t' ) 
2 .  [ai /3t] C,w ,t = [At' . [j3]c,w,t' ] ( [ai]C,w ,t ) 
• Derivation for 
[If Jack attended commencement this summer,  he would meet 
t he new Dean]C,w ,t,g : 
[ [Per/P PERF [AspP Vr; [WOLL [SIM [MET rp ] ] ]  7/J ] ]  ] C,g ,w,t 
= (by TFA) 
[PERF]C,g ,w ,t (At" .  [lYr; [WOLL [SIM [MET [rp] ] ]  7/J ] ] ] ] ] C,g ,w ,tll ) 
= (by lexical entry PERF) 
[AP. ::It' : RB(t , t') /\ P(t')= 1 ] (At" . [lYr; [WOLL [SIM [MET rp]] ] 7/J ] ] 
y,g ,w ,t" ) 
= (by two applications of A notation) 
::It' : RB (t , t') /\ [lYe [WOLL [SIM [MET rp] ] 7/J] ] C,g ,w ,t' 
= (by TFA) 
::It' : RB (t , t ') /\ [lYdc.g .w.t' (At"' . [WOLL [SIM [MET rp ] ] 7/J ] ] c.g .w.tlll ) 
= (by entry V c)  
::It' : RB(t , t' ) /\ [AP. Vt" � t' [P (t") ] ]  (At"' . [WOLL [SIM [MET rp] ] 7/J] 
] C,g ,W,t'II ) 
= (by two applications of A notation) 
::It' : RB (t , t') /\ Vt" � t' [ [WOLL [SIM [MET rp]] 7/J] ] c.g .w.tll ] 
::It' : RB (t , t') /\ Vt" � t' [ [WOLL]c,g ,w,t" ( [SIM [MET rp] ] C,g ,w ,tll ) ( [7/J]c.g.w.tll ) 
] 
= (by entries for WOLL and SIM) 
::It' : RB (t, t' ) /\ Vt" � t' [Ap .  Aq. Vw' [p (w') --+ q(w' ) ] ] (Ar. Aw" .  r (w") 
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1\ .::lw"' : r (w"') 1\ WIll <SIM,w will ( [MET cp]C,g ,w,tll ) )  ( ['ljJl,g,w,tll ) = ::It' : RB (t , t' ) 1\ Vt" � t' [Ap .  Aq. Vw' [P (w') -----+ q(w') l l (AW" . [MET 
cp] C,g,w,tll (w") 1\ .::lw"' : [MET cp]C,g,w ,tll (w"' ) 1\ WIll <SIM,w w") ( ['ljJ]C,g,w,t" ) 
= (by the entries for MET and cp combined by TFAI  and IFA; the entry 
for 'ljJ ; and further applications of A-notation) 
::It' : RB (t , t' ) 1\ Vt" � t' [Vw' [w' is metaphysically accessible from w 
at til 1\ ::It''' t til s .  t .  it is true in w' at t" that Jack will attend attend 
commencement this summer at tIll 1\ .::lw"' : [WIll is metaphysically ac­
cessible fom w at t" and s . t .  it is true in WIll at t" that Jack will attend 
commencement this summer 1\ WIll is overall more similar to w than 
w'l -----+ ::It'''' t t" s . t .  it is true in w' at t" that Jack will meet the new 
Dean at t""l l  
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Notes 
l This is an oversimplification of Stalnaker's ideas about the context . See Stalnaker 
( 1 975) ,  Stalnaker ( 1978 ) ,  Stalnaker (2002) for a detailed discussion of the notions of context 
and common ground. 
2 The definition of sim in Heim ( 1992) is as follows : 
(i ) Simw (p) = {Wi E W: Wi E P and Wi is as similar to w as any other p-world} . 
3Por any conversational background J, we can define the corresponding accessibility 
relation R f as follows : 
(i ) Rf := AW' .Vp [J(w) (P) = 1 ---+ p(w' ) = 1] .  
4Por the notion of overall similarity, see Lewis ( 1 979) .  
5Por a thorough analysis of SOT phenomena such as the one illustrated in the text, see 
Ogihara ( 1 996) , Abusch ( 1 997) , Stechow (2003 ) ,  and many others . 
6This is basically the structure in (2) . In fact, elsewhere I have suggested that the 
structure of what I call here "bare" conditionals is the structure of (at least some ) in­
dicative conditionals . Very briefly, indicative conditionals are not embedded under a tem­
poral/ aspectual structure. Since the time parameter of the accessibility relation is not 
manipulated by temporal and aspectual operators, it takes the speech time as its value . 
QUANTIFICATION OVER TIMES IN SUBJUNCTIVE CONDITIONALS 
7See Fintel and latridou (2002) for their definitions of left and right boundaries . In­
tuitively, RB and LB are the leftmost and rightmost subintervals of the perfect interval, 
respectively. 
8 According to Fintel and latridou ( 2002) ,  whether the universal quantifier is needed or 
not depends on whether the relevant predicate has the subinterval property of not . 
9 See Ippolito (2003a) for more discussion of this point . 
lOIn principle, there could be a world w' accessible from the actual world w ,  identical 
to the w up to the speech time where Jack died when he actually did and will attend 
commencement this summer: this will have to be a world where Jack comes back from the 
dead sometime between now and commencement . This world differs from the actual world 
in a fundamental way, in that the actual laws are violated. Strengthening Lewis ( 1 979) 's 
definition of similarity, worlds where violations of actual laws occur are never selected by 
the similarity function. 
l l Thanks to Danny Fox (p .c . )  for this suggestion. If the no-empty-domain restriction 
is not a presupposition, then we do not expect it to project the same way that other 
presuppositions - such as the one triggered by to stop - are. See Abusch and Rooth (to 
appear) and references cited there for a discussion of this issue with respect to strong and 
weak determiners. 
12 An utterance is a successful assertion only if it devides the context set in worlds where 
the proposition is expresses is true and worlds where it is false .  
13 As for why two pasts counterfactuals like (32-b) are felicitous just in case the speaker 
believes <p to be impossible , I have argued elsewhere that is it follows from a principle 
requiring speakers to maximize presuppositions . See Ippolito (2003b) , Ippolito (2003a) 
for more on two pasts counterfactuals . 
References 
ABUSCH , D .  ( 1997) : "Sequence of Tense and temporal de re ," Linguistics 
and Philosophy. 
ABUSCH , D . ,  AND M .  ROOTH (to appear) : "Empty-domain effects for pre­
suppositional and non-presuppositional determiners , "  in Context Depen­
dence in the Analysis of Linguistic Meaning, ed. by H. Kamp , and B . Par­
tee . Elsevier Publishers . 
BEAVER, D .  ( 1 994) : "When variables don't vary enough,"  in Semantics and 
Linguistics Theory 4, ed . by L. S. Mandy Harvey, Cornell . CLC Publisher. 
(200 1 ) :  Presupposition and Assertion in Dynamic Semantics. CSLI 
Publications and FoLLI. 
DOWTY, D .  ( 1979) : Word Meaning and Montague Grammar. Reidel , Dor­
drecht . 
FINTEL , K .  v . , AND S .  IATRIDOU (2002 ) :  "Since since ," MIT, ms . 
HElM , I .  ( 1982) : "The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases , "  
143 
144 Miche1a Ippolito 
Ph.D .  thesis , University of Massachusetts , Amherst ,  MA.  
( 1983) : "On the Projection Problem for Presuppositions , "  in Pro­
ceedings of WCCFL, vol . 2 ,  pp . 1 14-1 25. 
( 1992) : "Presupposition Projection and the Semantics of Attitude 
Verbs ," Journal of Semantics, 9 ,  183-22 1 .  
IpPOLITO , M .  (2003a) : "On the Semantic Composition of Subjunctive Con­
ditionals ," Universitat Tiibingen, ms. 
(2003b) : "Presuppositions and Implicatures in Counterfactuals ," 
Natural Language Semantics, 1 1 ,  145-186. 
KARTTUNEN , L. ( 1 974) : "Presupposition and linguistic context ," Theoreti­
cal Linguistics, I ,  18 1-194.  
KRATZER , A. ( 1 98 1 ) :  "The Notional Category of Modality," in Words, 
Worlds, and Contexts, ed. by H.-J . Eikmeyer , and H.  Rieser. de Gruyter , 
Berlin .  
( 1 99 1 ) :  "Modality, " in Semantics. An International Handbook of 
Contemporary Research, ed. by A .  v. Stechow , and D .  Wunderlich. De 
Gruyter, Berlin. 
LEWIS , D .  ( 1973) : Counterfactuals. Harvard University Press , Cambridge, 
MA. 
( 1979) : "Counterfactual Dependence and Time 's Arrow," Nous, 13 .  
MUSAN , R. ( 1 997) : "Tense , Predicates and Lifetime Effects , "  Natural Lan­
guage Semantics, pp . 271-301 .  
OGIHARA , T .  ( 1996 ) :  Tense, Attitudes, and Scope. Kluwer Academic Pub­
lishers . 
SOAMES , S .  ( 1 989) : "Presupposition," in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 
vol. IV, pp . 553-6 17. Reidel , Dordrecht . 
STALNAKER, R .  ( 1 974) : "Pragmatic Presuppositions , "  in Semantics and 
Philosophy, ed. by M. Munitz , and P. Unger , pp . 197-21 3 .  New York Uni­
versity Press , New York. 
( 1 975) :  "Indicative Conditionals ," Philosophia, 5 ,  269-286 . 
( 1 978) : "Assertion ," in Syntax and Semantics: 9, ed. by P. Cole. 
Academic Press , New York. 
(2002) : "Commn Ground," Linguistics and Philosophy, 25 ,  701-
72 1 .  
STECHOW,  A .  v .  (2003 ) :  "Binding by Verbs: Tense, Person and Mood under 
Attitudes ," in Proceedings of NELS 33. 
